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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

FARMER'S AND MERCHANT'S
BANI{:, a corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case Noc
8282

UNI,7 ERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT
CORPORATION,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Appellant engages in the bu.siness of financing the
operation of automobile dealers in all 48 states and the
District of Columbia. This operation encompasses two
forms of financing:
1. WHOLESALE: Ap·pellant pays the auto manufacturers for the dealers' new cars upon trust
rec~ipt financing or floor planning. Some of
these vehicles are, of course, used as dealer
demonstrators. Also, used cars may be floor
planned by the dealer. In all three recited
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instances when the dealer sells the car or
changes it from "floor plan" to "dealer demonstrator " he sends a check to Appellant to
'
pay off the outstanding b:alance on that car.,
He may then issue a sight draft on Appellant
for a slightly reduced,price, which sum dealer
receives. This, in effect, constitutes a refinanCing, but still on a wholesale plane.
2. RET.AIL: The car dealer s·ells an automobile
to one of his cmtomers. If the customer desires financing, he executes a conditional sales
contract to Appell~nt. The car dealer then
sends the contract to Appellant in a sight draft
envelop·e drawing on Appellant for the amount
of the contract enclosed. Also, the car deal·er
encloses his own check in the envelope to pay
the amount due Appellant on the "wholesale
floor plan" transaction.
.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence is uncontroverted that commencing in
October, 1952, .AppeHant commenced to finance the operation of Harry Parsley, Inc., a Lincoln-Mercury dealer in
Provo, Utah~
Respondent was Parsley's bank.
The evidence is not controverted that Respondent
bank was authorized to treat as cash sight drafts drawn
upon Appellant by p·arsley.
It should he clearly understood at this point . that
Resp·ondent has never denied giving this authority and
it .has never made claim that such arrangen1ent n1ust be
in 'vriting. It has acknowledged and does acknowledge
that this arr~ngement continued until December 24, 1952.
2
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From this point, there is conflict in the testim'Ony.
But the principal conflict, as Appellant will point out in
its subsequent sections, is in the testimony of Respondent's main witness, J. Hamilton Calder.
On December 24, 1952, the Salt Lake Manager of
Appellant instructed Respondent that sight drafts drawn
by Parsley for wholesale financing were no longer to be
treated as cash. Respondent acknowledged said termination of authority, and assured Appellant that its instructions would be followed.
On January 6, 1953, Appellant instructed R€spondent that sight drafts drawn by Parsley were not to be
treated as cash, regardless of whether they were for
wholesale or retail transactions. The evidence is that
there is no denial of said instruction nor of agreement
to abide thereby.
The conflict being that all drafts that were honored
as ·cash after December 24, 1952, were for wholesale items,
as Appellant claims, and were for retail items, as Re;...
spondent claims.
From January 5th to January 6th, 1953, sight drafts
were drawn on Appellant by Parsley and treated as cash
by Respondent for a total sum of $29;233.65.
Said sight drafts totaled thirteen in number.
Appellant stopped payment on said drafts.
At said time, Parsley had a cash balance of $7;802.57

3
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on deposit with Respondent, which sum Respondent offsetag_ainst said $29,233.65, leaving it a claim of $21,4-31.08.
The evidence is not controverted that on January
12, 19·5.3,. Respondent took a note from Parsley for
$21,000.00, secured by a mortgage upon all of Parsley's
inventory of p·arts and accounts receivable. There has
never been a release of this mortgage, and to the date of
trial, Resp·ondent admits to havj_ng collected and to retaining the total sum of $3,554.29 upon said mortgaged
accounts receiva:ble.
Parsley, Inc. was subsequently put into involuntary
bankruptcy upon the petition of Appellant, The State
Tax Comn1ission of Utah, and of others.
Respondent filed suit in the lower court, claiming
the sum of $21,431.08 from Appellant. On June 26, 1954,
Ap.pellant demanded that· the matter be tried by Jury, at
which time the Jury fee of $5.00 was paid.
Again on July 21, 1954, Appellant made demand for
trial by Jury. These demands were refused by the trial
cou.rt, an:d non-jury trial was commenced on the 4th day
of August, 1954.
It is from the trial·court's Judgment for the sum of
$17,876.81 to Respondent that this appeal is taken. Said
sum was computed by the allowance to Appellant of
$3,554.. 27, which was the amount collected and retained
by Resp·ondent from the accounts receivable Inortgaged
to it by Parsley.
4
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POINT I.
TH·E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING T-0 GRANT
APPELLANT A TRIAL BY JURY:

Authority need not be cited to show the court that
there is a right to trial by Jury in civil cases, not wholly
equitable- in nature.
Our rules of civil procedure clearly specify that one
demanding. a Jury trial of a civil matter may have it,
provided that timely demand therefor be made und-er
rules of local practice.
In the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, the
local rule is that Jury demand must be made at the time
the case is set for trial.
The hearing for trial date in this case was held on
May 7, 1954. ·On said date, the case was -scheduled for
trial on July 26, 1954.
On June 26, 1954, Appellant made formal demand
for Jury trial and paid the required $5.00 fee. The
demand was refused.
On July 21, 1954, Appellant, in open court, again
Inade demand for trial by Jury. It was again refuse<L
Trial of the case was not started until August 4, 1954,
at which time counsel for Appellant deemed it improvident to again request a Jury trial, in the light of two previous refusals.
Ap,pellant sub1nits to this Court that a demand Inade
thirty eight days before trial and again thirteen days
before trial is a resonable demand, and one that complies

5
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with the loose requirement that demand Inust be made
upon trial setting - it was announced that the trial date
would probably be postponed at the time of the trial
court's last refusal.
Further, if such local rule is deemed not complied
with, then said rule is unreasonable.
The action in refusing Appellant a trial of the issues
in this case by Jury was unreasonable and capricious and
is grounds for reversal.

POINT II.
WHOLE~

THE CONTRACTS HEREIN SUED UPO·N ARE
SALE CONTRACTS:

In this section, it is .important that it be clearly
understood that the subject of this controversy is thirte.en sight drafts, together with their contents, the contents being a delineation of whether the business transaction represented 'by the drafts were retail or wholesale. For ease of reference, they will be listed:
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
No.
Date of Draft
Customer Name
Amount
A
.January 5, 1953-Crandall B. Dunn ........ --------~$ 2,497.48
B,
January 5, 1953-Kenneth L. Herrington__________ 2,539.49

c

D
E
F
G
H
I

January 6, 1953-Arvil S. Conk____________________________
January 6, 1953-John DeWain Smith................
January 6, 1953.. Don Bush ore ·------·-----·-----------·
January 5, 1953-Harry ParsleY;· Inc.................
January 5, 1953-·Harry Parsley, Inc.................
January 5, 1953-Harry Parsley, Inc.................
January 5, 1953-Harry Parsley, Inc.................

2~682.50

2,466.79
2,557.84
2,693.95
2,509.57
3,738.95
3,982.81

$25,669.38

6
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The above items are, in fact, wholsale items, as will
be shown by Appellant in this section by reference to the
trial record.
In addition, the following drafts presented during
the same period of time become important, as will be
pointed out, as they -are, in fact, retail ite~, and Respondents were free to treat them as cash:
1.

2.
3.
4.

January 5,
January 5,
January 6,
January 6,

1953-LaMar Wilde ----------------------------$ 990.77
1953-Darrell North -------------------------- 718.90
1953-Dale Peterson -------------------------- 204.60
1953-Winafred A. Jones____________________ 1,640.00
$3,554.27

It will readily be seen that the total of the above two
amounts constitutes the amount of Respondent's claim,
less the cash from the Parsley account Respondent appropriated to its own cre'dit.
The record clearly shows, without contradiction, that
the former items, plaintiff's .Exhibits A through I, inclusive, are, in fact, wholesale transactions.
See R. 249. There is no conflict in the testimony
whatever as to that precept.
Nor is there a conflict that the second series of drafts
referred to were for retail transactions. See R-250, lines
14 to 20.
The contention of Respondent that it received a
peculiar definition of_ "wholesale" will be discussed in a
subsequent section of this brief. To this point, however,

7
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it is abundantly clear that said .drafts were wholesale,
established by uncontroverted testimony. Also, if ·the
court would cursorily examine the :contents of plaintjff's
Exhibits A through I, inclusive, there would be no doubt
that anyone would conclude they were wholesale .transactions, or, at the very least, ·an examination would create
a duty of inquiry as to their nature.
1

Also, at.this point, it is important that it be clearly
understood that the sight drafts totaling $3,554;27, listed
above, were given to Parsley_ Inc. by R-espond~nt (R-102,
lines 8 to 19, inclusive; R-173 line 28 to R-174), and were
so given against the wishes and advice of Appellant (R1~1, line 12 to R-102, line 5·; R-22, lines 1 to 16)
e

It isn't denied that the return of these drafts to
Parsley was the consideration given by Resp<?·ndoot to
Parsley in return for the note an~ mortgage executed in
favor of Respondent for $21,000.00. See the Judgment
of the trial court read from th~ bench on, the conclusion of
the trial. Also, see R-22, lines 17 to 28.
The foregoing makes it crystal clear that the first
nine drafts referred to, Plaintiff's Exhibits_ A through
I, were, i~ fact, ·wholesale drafts, disregarding for a
moment Respondent's peculiar claim of what is wholesale.
It is equally clear that the remaining four drafts
were for retail transactions.
These four retail transactions were later paid for,
in full, by Appellant. See R-228, Lines 18 through 30;
R.:229, lines 1 to 13.
8
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Thus it is seen that the trial court permitted Respondent to be paid for these four retail drafts twice.
·That the trial court, by its Judgment, is compelling Appellant to pay s:aid draf~s twice. Instead of paying
$3,554.27 for same, therefor, Appellant is made to pay
$7,108.54.
To further point up the injustice of the result,
Respondent relinquished these drafts to Parsley against
the positive recommendation and desire of Appellant,
who is now asked -to pay Respondent for ·doing what it
was instructed not to do. See R-101, line 12 to R-102,
line 5.
It is urged ~as elemental that the trial court committe'd error in not awarding Defendant-Appell-ant an
off-s-et against Plaintiff-Respondent for the sum of
$3,554.7, represented by property the Respondent took
to the full exclusion of Appellant, and for which Appellant subsequently paid Parsley said full sum.
Because Appellant urges an off-set here is not to
be considered to the slightest degree to be an acquiescence of validity of the remaining portion of the trial
court's ruling.
POINT III.
THAT RESPONDENT'S CLAIM OF INSTRUCTIONS AS
TO DETERMINATION OF "WHOLESALE" IS INCREDIBLE
AND CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE:

The trial court, in reaching its ruling against Appellant, found that when Appellant_ instructed Respondent'

9
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not to honor sight drafts as eash on items of ''wholesale" financing, that Appellant defined wholesale to
mean any sight drafts for figures in even amounts of
$3,000.00, $4,000.00, $5,000.00, $6,000.00, and additional
$1,000.00 figures.
The argument under all of the circumstances, is incredible; but the ·finding that such was done is breathtaking.
In this situation we are not dealing with children
nor with uninformed laity.

J. Hamilton Calder, Respondent's cashier, who claims
that he received such instructions has great and varied
financial background and experience:
1. Mr. Calder graduated from a local university
(R-129).
2. Mr. C·alder majored in Business Administration
at Stanford University (R-129-130).
3. Mr. Calder had four years experience in applicance financing (R-86, lines 8 to 22).
4. Mr. Calder has been wOTking in a bank for eighteen years :(R-86, lines 24 to 29), and
5. Was Cashier of the Bank, Respondent, at th~
time the transactions herein involved took place,
and is now a Vice-President (R-86-87).
The background of !Ir. Nichols, the employee of
Appellant, the person who is claimed to bave given sue)
a novel definition of "wholesale" is:
1. Eighteen years in the finaneing business (R-212,
lines 18 to 25 )·.

10
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There we have the background of these principals
involved in a discussion of:/ what is "wholesale": Appellant's employee with eighteen y¢ars experience in financing; Respondent's employee with twenty-two years in
financing with an e'ducation in business administration
from 'Stanford University.
Now then, on December 24th, 1952, Mr. Calder,
Respondent's Cashier, testifies tha_t Mr. Nichols told him
that Respondent was no longer to treat as cash sight
drafts for "wholesa~e" financing, and that Mr. Nichols
defined wholesale as being "even amounts" of $3,000.00
,or over, R-14, line 16 to R-16, line 7, where Mr. Calder
testified:
'' . . . Mr. Nichols was explicit in stating that we
were not to accept drafts on wholesal~ financing."
Now then, bearing this purported definition--.-even
amounts-in mind, let's examine the record -as to expert
testimony as to whether or not it is possible to tell the ,
character-retail or wholesale--of a transaction represented by a sight draft by reference to the face of the
sight draft :

A.

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT WITNESSES:

1. J. Hamilton Calder, Vice-Pre-sident and Cashier:
''I askd him how to determine whether a draft
"\Vas wholesale or retail and the reason I asked the
question is the drafts didn't reveal on its face
anything as to its character.'' R. 14, lines 25 to
28. Also see R. 169, lines 17 to 20.

11
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2. Victor J. Bir·d-Vice~President, R. 171, who has
twenty-five years experience in ihe ibanking business,
R. 203, lines 21, 22.
'' Q. I am asking you personally from the

face of a draft whether you can tell whether it is
wh·olesale or retail1
~'A. If I didn't kno'v the individual I would
not know whether it was wholesale or retail.
'' Q. By looking at the face. of the draft f
''A. I would not.
"Q. It is. impossible to tell, is it not f
''A. Yes sir.
'' Q. And you say it. is impossible f
''A. Y·es sir.''· R. 204, lines 9 to 18.
Aside .from an accountant who testified to other
matters, these are the only hvo ·witnes·ses produced by
R-espondent.

B.

DEFENDANT-APPELLAN~

WITNESSES:

1. Francis J. Nichols-Appellant's employee, with
eighteen years finance expe_rience, R. 212, lines 18 to
25, testified that it is impossible to t.ell the nature of a
transaction by looking at the face of a sight draft, R. 213,
an~d 'in res·ponse to the question.:

- '' Q. Any set formula in the financing business wher.e. figures are going to be odd or even f ''
he testified:

"A. No.''
12
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2. Clyde B. Sperry-Appellant's Branch Manager,
R. 225, with about eight years credit business experience,
R. 229, lines 12-13.
At R. 229, lines 27 to 30, 'he testified:
''A.
from the
''Q.
''A.

It would be· impossible to determine
face of that sight draft what it contained.
From any sight draft~
From any sight draft.''

3. Woodrow A. Wilkinson-Then Operations Manager for Appe.llant, R. 245, lines 9 to 14, and now VicePresident of Valley State Bank, Salt Lake City, R. 245,
line·s five to eight, having ten years finance business
experience, R. 250, lines 22-23.
At R. 250, line 28 toR. 251, line 7, this will be found:

'' Q. Based on your experience in the financing business, I would like you to tell me whether
or not you have an opinion as to whether it is
possible to distinguish between wholesale and
retail transactions by mere reference to the face
of a sight ,draft~
"A. Yes sir.
'' Q. Do you have an opinion~
' 'A. Yes sir.
'' Q. What is your opinion~
"A. It is absolutely impossible."
4. G. R. 1\fcElhany-Appellant's Vice-President, R.
256, with n1ore than eighteen years finance business
experience, R. 266, line 27, who testified at R. 267 that
such differentiation between ''wholesale-retail'' can not
be made by reference to the face of a sight draft.

13
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The foregoing should make it abundantly clear to the
Court and beyond equivocation THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL WHETHER A TRANSA·CTI9N.
REPRESENTED BY A SIGHT DR~FT IS OF A
WHOLESALE OR RETAIL NATURE BY REFER ..
ENCE TO THE FACE· OF THE DRAFT.
Now th·en, Re'Spondent tells tlie trial. -court that their
cashier with twenty-two year's conim.ercial experience
received such instructions from an empldyee of Appellant with eight~·en years commercial experience.
It is submitted that such statement should shock
the minds of reasonable men. What is even worse,. Mr.
Calder claims relUrnce on it.
The whole thing ;becomes. ludicrous by comparative
analysis, assuming for this purpose that Mr. Nichols
made such definition to Mr. Calder. Let's look at
~nalogies·:

1. Attorney A tells Attorney B, each with
eighteen and twenty:..two -y~ars experience, respectively, in response- to a. request for advice :
'' Settle the matt·er with him, bu,t don't
commit a tort."
Attorney B says: "What's a tort?"
Attorney A relates: ''A tort is where you
punch him in the nose.''
Attorney B then m·akes ·a swing to th·e solar
plexis ·of his adversary ·and claims no tort .Irecause
that wasn't the definition given him of a tort.

14
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2. P-atient tells the doctor to take out his
tonsils. The doctor asks where they are and is told
they are in the belly. The doctor takes -out the
appendix and says: "Golly, that's what my
patient. told me.''
Most certainly, ·even if the Bank Cashier was told
that a wholesale transaction could be detected from the
face of a check, whi~h is a ridiculous conclusion, then
he, as a banker with technical training and vast experience, knew better than to rely on it And one 'step further
-had no right to rely on it, but had a positive duty to
do otherwise.
No discussion is needed to inform anyone what ·lp.ust
be done to differentiate. You must open the envelopes.
At R. 169, lines 13 to 19, Mr. Calder testified that
except for the definition given him he would have to open
the envelopes.
At R. 135, Mr..Calder testified that no one told
not to open the draft envelopes.

~im

At R. 210, lines 12 to 23, Mr. Nichols, Appellant's
employee, te·stified he told Calder he would have to open
the envelopes to differentiate.
It is submitted that the Respondent bank certainly
had no duty to take such a responsibility of differentiation. But it did accept it and thus it ·created for itself a
stringent duty of care. The bank placed itself in a
position of peril and then wholly disregarded that peril.
It dan1aged itself.

15
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At· this point, Appellant wishes to refer to Defendant-Appellant's Exhibit No. 4, l'abled: "Memorandum
from Hamilton Calder,'' dated January 24, 1953. This
is. a :vesume' of ~he whole transaction written by the bank,
Respondent, to its ~ttorney, J. Rulon Morgan, R. 115 and
R. 116, lines 19 to 21, and admitted to be verbatim, except
as to change~ made on it by· Calder and initialed by him
( R. 150 to 152).
It is sub;mitted that_ the attempts at equivocaiion
and evasion of this exhibit's impact are re·adily apparent
at R. 115 and R. 116, and R. 149 to 151.
In any ev.ent, the court's attention is called to the
third parag:raph ,of the memorandum, wherein the
critical conversation of December 24th between Mr.
Calder .and Mr. Nich{)ls is related, it reads-:
''On December 24th ·:Mr~ Nichols called lo!J.g
distance an·d inf•ormed us . we were not to aooept
any 'more drafts from Parsley ·On used car flooring, OR ANY OTHER WHOLESALE FINANCING·.. I assured him we would accept no further
sight drafts for credit on WH·OLE:SALING UNLESS AUTHORIZED BY HIM, but would continue to give immediate credit on retail drafts."
(Emphasis supplied)
At R. 82, further evidence. of ~quivocation and a
patent change of story in Calder's testimony is found.
As pertains to the December· 24th conversation:

"Q. Didn't he {Nichols) elaborate on wholesale financing at all!
· · ''A. I didn't go in to the detail. He didn't
say anything about any wholesale financing

16
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exoopt on us·ed
mentioned.

~ars.

That is the only thing he

" *

"*
''A. The used cars were the problem.'.'
Also, commencing at R. 82, line 29, we find truthful
testimony for the first time concerning that ·conversa""
tion. Testimony that ·exactly coincides with the written
resume to his attorney:

'' Q. Any discussion how you could tell the
difference between a used car and a new car?
''A. My comment on the statetnent wa:s as to
whether it was solely used car financing.. The
conve·rsation was in ·regards to used ear financing
and used· car financing was the proble~. He did
relate that there would be no wholesale financing
of any nature BUT THERE WAS NO ;COMMENT AS TO WHAT THEY, AT THAT TIME,
CONSIDERED WHOLESALE FINANCING
WOULD BE·.'' (Emphasis supplied)
The memorandum contains no reference to eyen
amounts of $3,000.00 or more. The abov.e testimony states
no comment on what wholesale financing would be.
So, Calder - ,''assured him we would accept n.o
further sight drafts for credit on wholesaling unless
authorized by him ... ''
There is the problem and there. is the law suit finely
condensed:
1. No more wholesale drafts acceptable.
2. Bank agrees.

17
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3. Bank negligently pays wholesale.
4. Bank sues another to recoup a loss caused
by its own, :lnattention to its .own affairs~

Another thing, what, did the Bank know of the
financial affairs of ·H~rry Parsley, Inc.~:
A. It knew Parsley "kited" checks. See R.
96, line 22· to R. 98, line 27. The bank knew that
Parsley, on De-cember· 20th, 1954, was $17,000.00
short, and that the $17,000.00 was ~ade up not.
from his own funds, but: ''·With. funds from ]ri.s
routine ;operation ''R-98, line 27. The Bank,
knowing that ·Appellant .was financing Parsley
for . m'ore than $350,000.00 during a three month
period by .use of sight drafts drawn on Appellant,
R. 10, line·~ 12 to 30, was under a duty to inform
Appellant of ~ 'ch~k~kiting,'' whieh it did nat do,
R. 100,. lines 15 to 21.

B. It knew that Parsley's financial condition
was bad, as ·witness Calder's testimony commencing at R. 195, ~bearing in mind the $17,000~00 check
kite on Dec~mber 20th, 1952:
'' Q. Would you look at the entry here for
December 24, 1952, (Defendant-Appellanf;s ~x
hibit No. 1) and tell me what. Harry Parsley,. Inc.
balance was on that date a'S. shown by the records Y
(Monthly Bank statements to Parsley)

"A.
'' Q.
"A.
'' Q.
balance?
''A.

Three Cents $.03.
Three C'en ts Y
Yes siTe
Did you inf·orm !fr. Nichols of that
He didn't ask me.''
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Can you imagine - a $17,000.00 cheek kite $35~,000.00 wor:th of Appellant's finance money in three
months-.a THREE CENT balance-and Respondent's
cashier says : ''he didn't ask me.'' This- in· the ~ace of
Nichols telling Calder that Parsley's statement showed
a $90,000.00 operating profit, R. 10, lines 1 to 10. Refer
to R. 13~ for testimony of . other ridiculously small
balances.
Further, if the ·court will refer to Defendant-Appellant's Exhibit No. 1 it will see that there were -continued
small daily balances-all well within the 1bank's knowledge and comprehension, but 'beyond the knowledge of
Appellant. Also, refer to Defendant-App~llant's Exhibit
No ..2, a recap showing almost continuous overdrafts in
large amounts.
Coold-it ·be that Respondent's cashier had any interest in ke.eping Parsley in business with Appellant's
funds~ Could it be that he had such an interest that
Appellant was not informed of ,these matters~More cross examination of .Calder, R. 121 :
'' Q. What "ras th·e addres·s of Mr. Parsley's
business~

. ''A. North on 5th W esto
'' Q. You owned the Building didn't you¥

''A. N'O sir.
'~>Q.

Who did~
''A. I had an interest in the ·building
"Q. }I ow much of an interest 1

a

''A. Half interest. ''
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Appellant re·spect(ully urges this· Court that:
1. Defendant-Appellant's Exhibit -No. 4
represents a truthful statement of the Decemb_er
24th conversation. Certainly if there had been
~uch a novel instruction that yoJI ean tell a wholesale transaction from the -face of ·a check, such
would have· ·been stated in a letter to a litigant's
attorney. Hind sight is ·a beautiful thing, and
after all of the facts beca:rhe apparent, what could
Calder do but drum up a definition that would
give the bank a fighting chance to recover for its
·own neglect. Respondent will undoubtedly take
exception -:to this language, but in th~ face of the
testimony and the evidence it is felt that all' will
agree that the minds of reason8Jble men should
reject the patently/ ''last chance-after thought''
story of Respondent's cashier~
2. The· Bank undertook a V·ery ·stringent and
high duty and obligation of care by assenting to
such agreement of ·differentiation, ·and its duty
was heightened and increased when it knew of the
bad ba:rlking practice of Parsley and his poor
financial con·dition.
The full weight of the evidehce is against Respondent's clailned definition :of ''wholesale.'' The bank was
under a duty to .open the envelopes.
·Technical dis·cussion of what is really wholesale need
not be entered into. l\{ost ·certainly, a reasonable man,
a banker 'vith· t'venty-two years experience, A Fortiori,
'vould, upon looking at the contents of subject draft
envelopes, have been on guard. Why~: (1) on four of
the1n there '\Vas a transfer from Parsley to Parsley; (2)
on all of them, the price was ''invoice''; ( 3) on none of
20.
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them was there a charge for state sales tax; (4) on most
of them the word ''wholesale'' appeared.

A phone call from ·Calder to Nichols would have prevented the loS"s·e.s herein oo.mplained of as well as this
law suit.
One last precept of this relationship and Calder's
story of '''even amounts '' should effectively sha,tter any
possibility of belief..
Refer to Defendant-A,ppellant's Exhibit No. 5, which
are ex~act copies of all original deposit slips of I{arry
Parsley in Respondent bank, ( R. 144, line 23, to R. 145,
line 1). Each sight draft deposited during this period
of ,time is therefor individu3rlly listed in DefendantAppellant's Exhibit No. 5. (R. 145, lin·e 6 to R. 148, line
12).
Plea:se· note that ·during this entire period of time
there were only two drafts ''over $3,000.00 In even
$1,000.00 a1nounts. ''
. The first item; referred to, a $10,000.00 draft, may
not_ be ·considered and has no part in this law ·suit f.or
the reason that the· Court ordered testimony us to said
$10,000.00 item stricken at R. 133 and 134. In any event,
the draft for ·$10,000.00 wa·s· not presented until January
5th, 1953, and Mr. Calder couldn't identify the $6,000.00
item (R. 170).
The important precept is that from October 1st, 19_52
through January of 1953, only two items, questionable
ones, in even amounts were ever deposited by Parsler.
21
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T-his makes C-alder's ~statement that he relied on an
"eve:n amount" definition even more unbelievable. Why?
Be-caus·e even amounts are a rarity and C.alder knHw
it and knows it. And he knew there had been a continued
-cours-e of wlrolesale financing.
If there re:quiitis -doubt that Calder wouldn't or
didn't t·estify to what was expedient, cl~iming knowledge
and truth, let's examine one ~.ore phase .of his testimony
on direct examination and cornp-are it with cross-examination, concerning Plaintiff-Re'spnndent's Exhibits K, N,
and R:
1

1. Exhibit K:

Direct Examination: '' Q. I show you, Mr.
Calder-a· photostatic copy of . . . plaintiff's. expibit K ... and ask you to. e~amine it and tell us
whether or not you re<}ognize th·e document~ ''A.
Y·es sir, I recognize this .as a photostatic copy of
a qhook ... The amount of the check is $1,779.64
... ,., (R. 37)
Cross Exanvination: "Q. All right, Mr.
Calder, "viii you look at Plaintiff's Exhibit K for
me and tell me what the amount of the check is
without referring to any notes that you might
have~ A. " ... the check is $5,197.64." (R. 107)
2. Exhibit N:

Direct Examination: ''~Q. I show you . . .
"E)Chibit N arid ask if you re~ognize that .. ~'1 ' ' ' 'A.
Yes -sir, I recogniz.~ this as a photostatic copy of a
d~ocum·~nt ... in 'th~ amount of $3,598.55~" (R. 41)
Cross Examin-ation: '' Q. I ask you to look at
plaintiff's Exhibit N and .tell me the amount of

22
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that! "A. It appears to be $2,535.55." (Rc 109,
110)
3. Exhibit R:

Direct Emmination : '' Q-. I show you what
has been marked ~s- plaintiff's Exhibit Rand ask
you if your recognize that as a photostatic copy
of an original check . . . 1'' ''A. I recognize tha:t
as a photostat of an o~ginal check in the amount
of $1,165.00 ..• " (R. 44)
Cross Examination! "Q. Now I ask you to
look a.t what has been marked a'S plaintiff's Ex~
hibit R, Mr. Calder, and I want you to tell me
what the -amounlon that one is 7'' ''A. It ap·pears
to be $l,OOO.oo~"

It is respectfully sumitted- that Mr. Calder's · testimony i-s inhe:r;ently unworthy of belief~ It is in6redible.
It is testimony iborn of hind-sight and expediency, fosfered
tt> recoup a- loss caused by, -charitably :speaking, rank
negligence.
POINT IVo
THAT ST~TEMENTS OF PROMISE -To HONO·R WHOLE ...
SALE DRAFTS AF-TER DECEMBER 24TH, 1952, IF MADE,
ARE UNENFORCEABLE UN.DER THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS:

To this ·point, Appellant has confined itself to the
establishment of the facts that:
1. The drafts in question were, in fact, wholesale drafts, and
2. Respondent agreed that it would not
handle wholesale drafts after December 24, 1952.

23-
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Here, Appellant wishes .to :again point .up disparity
and inconsistency of testimo~y of witnesses for Respondent and to show that no ·subsequent promises were made
to pay wholesale ·drafts after D·ecember 24t4..
The Court's attention is called to Defendant-Appellant's Exhibit No. 4----the memorandum from Calder to
Respondent's attorney-paragraph 5, which reads:

"On .January 7th Mr. McConnell an5l Mr.
Sperry called at the b~nk regarding checks they
were holding on Harry Parsley, In·corporated.
They . assured us th_ey wo.uld accept RETAIL
drafts in the process of clearance, but would pay
no further drafts signed by Mr. Parsl.ey." (Emphasis suppli~·d)
Now then, compare the above with th·e ''hind-sightexpedient" te~timony produee:d at the trial by Re~pond·:.
ent 's Mr. Calder on cross-examination:
R. 113, line

24 to R.

)_14, line 10:

"Q. Now, on Ja~uary 7th Y<?U h·ad a conversation 'vith Mr. McConnell .and Mr. Sperry,
·
is that~correct~
' 'A. Yes sir.
'' Q'! Did you have any conversation with
them -regarding .sight drafts previously brought
to you by Harry Parsley that were then in the
process of clearance~
·'~A. Yes.·
."Q. Did they tell you that RETAIL drafts
that were in the process of clearance 'vould be
honored~ (Emphasis supplied)
"A. No.
24
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•

'' Q. What did they say·!
''A. They said drafts now in the process of
clearance would be honored but they would accept
no further. dra.f.ts on Mr. Parsle~ 's · account.
·
"Q. They didn ~t differentiate ~tween retail
and wholesale then~
·
"A. No sir.''
For Appellant to technically describe or label such
testimony would tbe useless _delineation of the obvious.
The sixth par~graph of Defendant-Appellant's Exhibit No. 4 remain-s uncontradicted by Responqe.nt in the
record, although Appellant's Witness W. A. Wilkinson,
Vice-President of Valley State Bank, denies it. (R. 246,
line 17 to R. 247, line 11)
Appellant realizes, however, that all things in this
appeal must be construed in .the light most favorable to
Respondent._
Therefor, assuming that Mr. Wilkinso:q,. told 1\fr.
Bird at the bank that, all of these· drafts would clear, did
the Respondent bank. have a right to rely on Wilkinson's
statement~

It is'·submitted it did not, and for these reasons:.
1. The Bank admits as-suring Mr. Nichols of
Appellant _Corporation that it would accept no
further wholesale drafts unles·s authorized ·by
HIM (Nichols). (Third paragraph Defendant~
Appellant's Exhibit No.4). There is no testimony
or evidence of any kind that Nichols ever remanded -said in~tructions. He didn't.
2. Mr. Bird, Respondent's Vice,.. President,
was alone with Wilkinson when he claims Wil-
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kinson said the drafts would be paid (R. 200,
from line 27). Mr. Bird ·did not even know who
Mr. Wilkinson was (R. 176, line 9 to R. 177, line
'21), -and neither -did the Bank's C·ashier, Mr.
Calder (R. 3, lines 16 .to 18).
Mr. Bird testified th~t the Bank ·could have prevented its loss up till. 6:30p.m. on January 7th, 1953, the
day of the Bird-Wilkinson con~ersation by refusing to
pay checks drawn by Parsley, but that it d.idn 't do so
_because of reliance on Wilkinson (R. 206, lines 10 to 30).
Here agains-what inherent incredibility, or more
aptly ch~racterized, in view of Appellant's being ~saddled
with the ''most favorable light on respondent,'' what
naivete, coming from a Banker ·with twenty-five some
odd ye-ars experience.
About $30,000.00 at stake, and Respondent claims a
right to reliance on a s.tatement made by 'aD employee
of Appellant whos~ position was unknown to Respondent.
F'g.rther' if .such 'Statement was made, which is denied,
and if the Bank had a right to rely on it, which is ridiculous, the agre~ment to pay said drafts must have been in
writing tinder the positive provisions of Title 25, Chapter
.5, Section 4 (2) 1953 Utah Code Annotated.
Resp_ondent m-~y claim an estopple-, but such precept
has no application because of lack of a_ right of reliance
as is hereinabove discussed.
As a matter of: fact, it is submitted as elemental
that the B·ank ·should nave taken every step to protect
itself -and to double ch.eck these transactions because of
the ''whole sad state of affairs" that had already developed. All within the knowledge of the Bank.
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Respondent had :a positive duty, aside from the
dictates of ·ordinary sense, to stop everything and ''take
a good long look,'' to quote the language of Appellant's
Mr. McElhany, (R. 262).
What would it be supposed that any reasonable·-man
should do, much less an expirenced banker, if a car
dealer wrote some $23,000.00 worth of bouncing checks
to its. financing company, and yet was drawing on said
finance .company for about $30,000.00~ (R. 265, l~nes 17
to 23 ; R. 246 ; R. 235, 236, 237, 238).
The reas:onable man would have :stopped all tranactions. Particularly if he were involved.
But Respondent attempts to tell 'the courts, sueces·sfully below, that Respondent did everything rig)lt.
It followed instructions and protected itself and Appellant, and its loss was occasioned by Appellant, whose whole
story of the proceedings was rejected, yet no contradictions can be found iJ.?- Ap·pellant 's testimony.
~fore

to the point for justifiable outrage-judgment
was rendered for Respondent on the testimoll:y of Calder,
principally, whose testimony is a study in expediency,
deceit, and
conflict.
. '
.

POINT V.
RESPONDENT NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER EOR
CHECKS PAID UNDER MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIO-N OF SUFFICIENT FUNDS:

The Respondent in this· action m'akes much ''to-do''
over Appellant's having received some of the funds that
the Bank paid.- out on the subject ~ight drafts.
27
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Appellant does not deny that the bank honored s·ome
checks drawn to its favor by Parsley, and that the
source of payment for said checks was the -credit allowed
-~arsley on subjoot ·sight drafts.
However, to this point it is abundantly cl~ar··that:

1. Appellant was unacquainted with· .the.
shabby financial condition of Parsley.
2. That the. Bank d~sregarded instructions as
to acceptance of wholesale drafts.
3. That the bank knew that for each sight
draft it honored, ~there was a cheek enclosed from
Parsley to Appellant for most of the amount of
each 'Sight draft (examination of· the contents of
each sight draft in this action reveals that), and
that ·.as drafts were honored by the hank, there
would shortly come through for payment the check
enclosed by Parsley to A·p~ellant's order.
It 1s clear that each of the checks made . -out to
Appellant by Parsley that 'vere honored. by the b.~nk
'vere enclosed in draft envelo-pes representing funds
credi.ted before December 24th, 1952.
Clearly, the· bank paid these checks on the mistaken
assumption that their depositor, Parsley, had sufficient
funds· to handle them. They """ere wrong because the
source of fhnds they_ had ·counted on was dried up becauseof the Bank's breac·h of agreement in handling ''wholesale'' drafts as cash.
It is elemental that a Bank that mistakenly makes
payment on a check, thinking funds- are sufficient, has
28
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no recourse against the payee but must recover, if at all,
against the drawe-r of the check. ·
5 Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Section
1552, provides :
''If a bank pays a draft ·or a check on the
mistaken assumption that the drawer has sufficent funds to his credit to 1neet the instrument,
no recovery ·can he had if this assumption turns
out to be an error.-''
In Michie, ·Banks and Banking, Section 142,
language appears:

thi~

'~In the absence of fraud on the part of the
holder-the payment of a check by a bank is regarded as a finality, and the fact that the drawer
ha;s not funds on deposit will not give the ~bank
any remedy agains-t the holder. A mistake in
regard to the amount of the customer's deposit is
not such a mistake of fact as -entitles a_ hank p:aying a check to recover back the amount from the
payee. BANKS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE IN=
FORMED OF A DEPOSITOR'S FINANCIAL
STANDING and to know the condition of his
account with them at the time of presentation
of checks for payment. THEY ARE REQUIRED,
AND FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY, ARE COM..
PELL-ED TO KNOW AT ALL TIMES THE
BALANCE OF THE CREDIT OF EACH INDIVIDUAL CUSTOMER, and they accept and pay
checks at their own risk and pe-ril. If from negligence· or inattention to their ·own affairs- banks
impr·ovidently pay when the account of a customeT
is not in a ·condition .to warrant it, ... the bank
must look to the customer for rectification, and
not to the party to whom the check was paid.''
(Emphasis supplied)

29
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Supr-a: . 5 Mitchie, Banks -an~ Banking, Permanent
Edition, Sec.. 229.; American Law Institute, R-estatement
of the Law of Restitution, Sec. 33; First National Ba;nk
~s.. Bu:rkhardt, 100 U.S. 686 ;: Hayes vs. Tootle-Lacy Bank,
72 F.: 2nd ~29 ·'(lOth· CCA) ; Secur~ty National Bank of
Sioux _City vs. Ol~ NatiotULl B01nk, 241 F. 1, 1 (8 .CCA);
Oregon. Iron· and $teel vs. Kelso State Ban]f,, 224 P. 569
(Wash.); Fi.rst National Bank of Port~ vs . .Noble_,
168 P. 2n.4 354 (Oreg.);· 7 Am. Jur. 443; ·9 C.J.S. 722; 2
·Morse Banks and B·anking, 6th ·Ed. 1001; 7 Zollman,
:·Banks and ~anking, :Perm. Ed. 445.
The above represents the universal rule with respec-t
to ~anking pr~ctice·. There are no exeeption:s ·to it. ·
Of .course Respondent claimed fraud in its pleading,
but such contention was readily rejected by the trial
court, -and it is submitted that .a full and thorough examination of_ the_,trial record would not give ,sufficient credence tQ any ·such claim to. even permit, IN GOOD TASTE,
an allegation thereof . ·
A look at Defen~ant-Appellant's Exhibit No. 2 will
reveal to the Court .the e?Cact daily state of the Bank
account of Par~ley---->-:overdrafts of th:ousands of ,dollars.
The bank )vas and is chargea·ble with that knowledge.
T.he bank knew that the· principal source of funds
in Parsley's account w:;ts from Appellant's payment of
sig)l.t' drafts dta\vn on it.
The bank knew that in each sight draft there- was . a
:check for most of the amount of the draft, payable to
Appellant.
30
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The bank knew t~-at Appellant would deposit these
cheeks and expect to get paid.
Now then, Appellant gets paid on so:me of the checks
enclosed in sight drafts already paid by App:ellant and
Respondent cries fraud.

One step further; though Respondent makes claim to
re~imbursement

for monies paid to Appellant on the
~becks mentioned, nowhere is an exact amount claimed
or pleaded

It appears that the Respondent merely bases its
claim, in this regard, to recovery because Appellant
received ''some money.'' But Appellant also lost money
-some $70,00.00.
True, Respondent in its brief will come up· with a
total amount, and with exhibits of checks honored which
were only produced after Calder's aborted attempt to
testify as to "truth" and "knowledge" from photostatic
coptes.

In any event, Respondent's claim to restitution under
the theory berein discussed is untenable.

POINT VI.
IF THERE WAS A DEBT DUE FROM APPELLANT TO
RESPONDENT, IT WAS PAID AND DISCHARGED UPON
EXECU'riON OF THE PARSLEY MORTGAGE TO RESPONDENT:

For the purposes of this argument, let's assume that
there was a joint and several obligation from Appellant
and Parsley to Respondent.

31
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On January 12, 1953; the ·debt thus due to Respondent was not then liquidated, for 'the reason that an
exa-ct computation of the claimed debt was not made
until a filing of the Cilmplaint by Respondent.
Refer to Defendant-A-ppellant's Exhibit No.4 where
·Respondent claims a n~t -deficiency of $20,981.33, and then
refer to the amount asked in its Complaint, which is
$21,431.08.

lt is clear, therefor; that on January 12th, 1953, there
was an unliquidated joint and several obligation.
On January 12th, Respondent took a note and chattel
1n.ortgage from Parsley to itself to secure the sum of
$21,000.00, a liquidated and compromised amount, for
valuable consideration. ·
Cross Examination, C.alder; R. 102:

"Q. Now the reason Mr. Parsley wanted you
to return the drafts was because they were retail
i terns, isn 't that correct~
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. That is the conversation you had with
him and you ;did teturn them bec:ause'they were
retail items-~
"A. We returned them because he said they
had a value .to him and he could realize the value
from them by -either selling them to the Universal
C.I. T ~ or ·disposing -of them. ''
Direct Examination, Ca.lfZfl~"--, R. 22:
'' Q. Do you know the reason why 'Mr. Parsley wanted the drafts returned to him~
''A. Yes. He insisted on them for consideration of signing a-note and mor.tgage ·which the
32
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ibank took at the time to protect it against loss
on these dishonored -drafts.
'' Q. So that in eonsidera tion for 'the return
of ,these drafts he gave you a note and mortgage
on his property 1
''A. He gave us a note and mortgage ... ''
l~

is clear beyond equivocation that Respondent
thereby converted an unliquidated, unsecured debt into
a liquidated, secured debt, for value.
It is respectfully submitted that the bank took said
note and mortgage as PAYMENT IN FULL of the obligation that arose to it.
To justify a conclusion of payment in full:
1. The hank. filed, under oath, its claim as a
secured creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings in
Federal Court, claiming its debt good and not a
preference, and was given for value. (See plead_ings). The bank still has that ·claim and claims
full validity.

2.. The bank took the note and mortgage
secretly, and refused to release it, and collected
money thereon :

Calder, Cross Examination:
'' Q. Now, calling your attention to on or
about the 13th day of January, 1953, do you recall
being pre'Sent at a conversation with Mr. McElhany and myself and other officers of your bank
wherein we discussed the position of Harry Parsley, Inc.~

"A. Yes sir .
. "Q. Was it at that Ineeting, Mr. Calder, that
33
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it was agreed you· and Mr. Nichols would supervise
thre operation of the business!
''A. My recollection is . . . yes sir.
'' Q. And as a consequence of that meeting,
isn't it true that these used cars you testified to,
that Universial C.I.T. would return to Mr. P:arsley's lot!
''A. I understand they were returned.
' ' Q. All returned T
' 'A. All returned. Ye-s.
"Q~ At that time you didn't mention that
your company ·had taken a mortgage on all the
property the day before, did you T
''A. Well ...
'' Q. Well, just answer . . .. T
"A. January 20th, that was when it was first
mentioned." (R. 102-103).

"·
"*
"Q. Calling your attention to January 20,
1953, on that .partieular date there was a meeting
in. the board room at your bank iat which myself
and John Rampton, Attorney for the State Tax
Commission, Mr. Parsley, Mr. McElhany, Mr.
Sperry, your-self, Mr. Hedquist (President of the
bank), and Mr. Bird were all pre·sent. Is that
!true!
''A. That is true.
''Q~ The substanc~ of that conference was
that: things were not going well in managing
Harry Parsley's ·business, pursuant to the agreement 've made on January 13th. Is that right 1
''A. Yes.
34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Q. It was at that meeting that your
attorney, J. Rulon Morgan, first informed all concerned parties of this chattel mortgage and note
that was taken from Mr. Parsley by your company
on J:anuary 12th~
'·
''A.. That is right
"Q. Now, do you recall my having asked you
and other officers of the bank to relinquish that
mortgage~

' 'A. Yes 'Sir
"Q. And what was your answer~
' 'A. .
I recall the reply came from Mr .
Morgan.
"Q. And what did he say~
''A. He said under no circumstances would
we release the chattel ( R. 118-119).,
,, *
0

Q

..

" *
" *
'' Q. Mr. Calder, in connection with the
assignment of accounts receivable to the bank,
how much have you collected of those accountis
.... to date, do you remember 1
''A. . .. It is in the neighborhood of $2,400.00
(R. 70).

3. Respondent did not make claim nor reserve claim of any kind against Appellant when
it took said note and mortgage:
Calder, Cross-Examination:
'' Q. On the date the mortgage and note were
executed, Mr. ·Calder, no reservation of rights or
claims against Universal C.I.T. were made in
writing by you, were there~
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"A. In the instrument -itself 1
"Q.. y es s1-r.
.
"A. No.
'' Q. Or by any other instrument~
"A. N o. sir.
.

''Q.
"A.
''Q.
C~I.T. at
''A.
"Q.

Or by -any other document~
No sir.
No demand w·as made on Universal
:any time for the payment of this~
Subsequent to this~
During January 12th and 13th, is that

true~

''A. No, there had not been. Subsequent to
that there has been, though." (R. 103-104)c
Title 15, Chapter 4, 1953 Utah _Code Annotated contains the provisions relating to discharge of co-obligors.
15-4-3 provides :
"PAYMENT BY CO-OBLIGOR The
amount or value of ·any consideration received by
the obligee from one or more of joint or of joint
and several obligors, in whole or in partial satisfaction· of their obligations shall be credited to the
extent· of the amount received on the obligation
of all coobligors to whom the obligor or obligors
giving the consideration did not stand in the relation nf a surety. ' '
Itis submitted that the above section controls in this
matter:
1. There was a co-obligation, for purposes of
this argument, from Appellant and Parsley to Respondent.
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2.. The Respondent, for value, received the
note and mortgage from Parsley for $21,000.00, in
full payment
3. Appellant was not a surety of Parsley.

Respondent, of course, will strongly argue that it
did not accept the note and mortgage as payment.
Appellant urges thi·s court, however, that the facts
adduced at the trial show beyond doubt that the bank's
intent "\Vas to accept said new obligation as payment in
full.
They secretly took the mortgage.
They tenaciously hung on to it.
They collected money on it.
They did and do now claim it to be wholly valid
and in full force and effect in every'aspect (under oath
1n the Federal District Court).
It is submitted that Respondent had and has no
right to "cross its fingers."
The. result of the trial court's judgment is a compelling of Appellant to become an unwilling ~assignee
of Respondent's mortgage in the 'bankruptcy proceedings-though the court in its findings and judgment
made no mention that Appellant would be entitled to
Respondent's share of any proceeds upon distribution
in bankruptcy.
The hank, by acceptance and retention of the note
and mortgage caused an extinguishment of any rights
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whatever that it may have had as a result of the previous transactions.
POINT VII.
THAT RESPONDENT, BY TAKING A NOTE AND
MORTGAGE, IRREVOCABLY ELECTED ITS SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHT FOR ENFORCEMENT.

In order that Appellant's position in this section
will be cle:ar, conceding again for argument th·at an
obligation to Respondent was in existence, there must
be -clear deline·ation between election of remedies and
election of substantive rights.
At 18 Am. Jur., 131, this language appears:
"Often, what is spoken -of in judicial opinions as a choice between remedies is in reality
a choice of ~alternative substantive rights. The
distinction is not one infrequently obscured, and
yet it is important that it be heeded. An election between substantive rights g-oes, not to the
form, but to the substance, affecting some right
selected. . . . The ·doctrine of election of remedies applies in order to protect one from vexatious litigation, while the rule as to election of
suibstantive rights has to do with the !actual
status of some property or c9ntrnctual rights.
That is to s-ay, ·a person having the option to fix
definitely ·a property or contractual right without reference to the consent or wishes of the
oth~r party to the transaction is bound by the
exercise of his option. ''
It is Appellant's claim that the bank, 'by. taking the
note and mortga.ge, and keeping it over the objection
of Appellant, and collecting money on it, and claiming it
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valid under oath in bankruptcy proceedings, thereby is
pre-cluded from asserting any claims ·against Appell'ant
whatever. Respondent has made a positive election of
its substantive right. It thus waived any substantive
right it may have had against Appellant.
Respondent, if it is to recoup any part of its loss,
must pursue the course it chose for itself-collect on the
basis of its rights as a secured creditor in the bankruptcy
proceedings ag·ainst Parsley, Inc.
Appellant should not be compelled to stand in the
shoes of the bank ·and defend the 1bank's position.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
The testimony produced ~at the trial will not, in the
minds of reas·ona;ble men, substantiate the novel finding
that it is possible to detect a wholesale trans·action by
looking at the face of a sight draft.
The testimony, to the minds of all reasonable men,
will neither support ~a finding that Appellant's employees
made statements promising· payment or that Respondent's employees had any right of reliance even if they
'vere made.
The Respondent chose its substantive right for
enforcement, and judgment should he directed in favor
of Appellant and against Respondent, no cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE E. BRIDWELL·
Attorney for Appellant.
'/
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Attorneys for Respondent
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